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Commentary
John H. Cochrane
falls while the funds rate is rising. Though long-
term forwards decline overall in both recoveries
(1994-96 and 2004-06), the earlier experience
includes a blip up in all rates through 1995, which
is later reversed. This experience is missing in
the second period. This remaining difference is
Greenspan’s “conundrum.”
The difference is already small. Furthermore,
because the rise in the funds rate was much stead-
ier in the later episode, the behavior of market
rates relative to the funds rate (which reflects
different behavior by the Fed) is even less different
across the two episodes than the overall behavior
of interest rates. If one regards long-term rates as
dynamically driven by the federal funds rate, it’s
not obvious that there is any difference in the
behavior of markets.
Even if the later period is different, why is it
puzzling? First, long forwards should fall when
the Fed tightens. This is exactly how the world
is supposed to work. Tighter policy now means
lower inflation later, and thus lower nominal rates
in 10 years. There is no model or estimate any-
where in which the Fed can raise real rates for
10 years without reducing inflation. Prices are not
that sticky! In 1994, the opposite nearly one-for-
one rise of long forwards with rises in the federal
funds rate was viewed as a conundrum for just
this reason. The main, somewhat convoluted,
story used to explain the 1994 events is that an
interest rate rise communicates bad news about
inflation from the Fed to the markets—information
T
he paper by Glenn Rudebusch, Brian
Sack, and Eric Swanson (2007) is an
impressive survey of several literatures
concerned with monetary economics
and interest rates. It is well done, so I think the
best thing for me to do is to highlight what I
think are the central points and to give my views
on those points.
WHAT “CONUNDRUM”?
Figure 1 presents the federal funds rate and
1- to 15-year forward rates through the past two
recessions. This comparison lets us easily consider
to what extent the recent behavior of long-term
forward rates represents an unusual experience
or not.
My first reaction to Figure 1 is that the pat-
terns are strikingly similar. Short-term yields and
forwards decline, spreads widen, and then yields
and forwards recover as spreads tighten again. In
both episodes there is a little blip on the way down
in which long-term yields and forwards rise much
more than short-term ones, despite no movement
in the funds rate (late 1992 and 2002). In both
episodes there is an event on the way up in which
all yields and forwards increase sharply (late 1994
and 2004).
The main difference between the two episodes
is that the rise in the federal funds rate in 2004-06
is much smoother and more predictable and long-
term forward rates, in particular the 10-year rate,
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have, of course. Greenspan himself echoed this
view in 19941:
In early February, we thought long-term rates
would move a little higher as we tightened.
The sharp jump in [long] rates that occurred
appeared to reflect the dramatic rise in market
expectationsofeconomicgrowthandassociated
concerns about possible inflation pressures.
Of course, this is a simplistic discussion. A
tightening has to be unanticipated in order for it
to lower forward rates through this channel, and
evidence from other sources, such as the Treasury
inflation-protected securities mentioned by Chair-
man Greenspan or foreign interest rates, also bears
on the issue. Still, where did anyone get the idea
that monetary policy should control long-term
rates and that it is puzzling if long-term rates do
not “respond” positively to tightening? The nat-
ural benchmark predicts exactly the opposite, if
any, effect.
Second, to the extent that the decline in for-
ward rates represents a cyclical or secular decline
in term premia, that decline also is perfectly nat-
ural. Term premia, like all risk premia, should
Cochrane
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1 I owe the quote to Gallmeyer et al. (2007).























Federal Funds Rate and Selected 1- to 15-Year Forward Rates Through Two Recessions
SOURCE: Forward-rate data are from Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006).decline as we come out of recessions, and have
done so in every past recession. Even negative
term premia are not a puzzle—they should be neg-
ative. In a world with stable inflation, interest rate
variation comes from variation in real rates; and,
in such a world, long-term bonds are safer invest-
ments for long-term investors. Rolling over short-
term bonds runs the “reinvestment risk” that
short-term (real) rates will change, so short-term
bonds should bear the burden of any bond risk
premia. We expect only a positive term premium
in a world with unstable inflation and relatively
constant real rates, such as the 1970s. Because
short-term rates adapt quickly to inflation changes,
rolling over short-term bonds has less risk to a
long-term investor than does buying only long-
term bonds in this environment.
In sum, were I a Fed Chairman testifying to
Congress with the plots of Figure 1 in hand, I
would be tempted to point out that, far from a
“conundrum,” the world is finally behaving
exactly the way it should—and so is the central
bank. The increased transparency and predictabil-
ity of operating procedures, seen in the steadiness
of the rise in funds rates in 2004-06 verses the less
predictable rise in 1994-96, has communicated
to the markets the Fed’s steadfastness in control-
ling inflation. We are moving to the sensible world
of negative risk premia, which is exactly what we
should see once markets understand that inflation
is vanquished forever. The conquest of inflation
has removed an unnecessary risk premium for
long-run investors and issuers of long-dated nomi-
nal bonds. I don’t necessarily believe all this, of
course, but it would be awfully tempting to make
this argument were I defending the Fed’s actions
before a congressional committee. The “conun-
drum” is Greenspan: Why did he say anything
else?
Finally, it is academics’ job to remind policy
debaters of basic economics, so I think we should
pounce anytime somebody says something like
“[the] decline in the term premium...is financially
stimulative and argues for greater monetary policy
restraint.” Every price reflects both supply and
demand. Low interest rates can reflect a lack of
good investment projects as easily as they can
reflect an abundance of savings. To take a local
example, low housing prices in East St. Louis do
not seem to be particularly “stimulative.”
DECOMPOSING THE YIELD
CURVE
My grumpy comments about “conundrum”
and the “stimulative” effects of low prices not-
withstanding, this episode does highlight the
importance of splitting the yield curve into
expected future rates and risk premia and of
understanding the dynamic structure of risk pre-
mia and their macroeconomic underpinnings.
Here Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson provide a
very nice summary of the state of the art.
I think the bottom line is that we know less
than we think about this decomposition and far
less than the pronouncements in policymakers’
quotes imply. The paper can be read as a compre-
hensive survey of one failure after another. Here,
let me give two quick, and I hope memorable,
points in this litany of ignorance.
Levels, Differences, and Standard Errors
I learned two important lessons while Monika
Piazzesi and I (2006) investigated this kind of
decomposition. First, how you specify trends,
cointegration, etc.—which the data say very little
about—is overwhelmingly the most important
issue in driving the decomposition of the long-
maturity end of the yield curve. Second, the stan-
dard errors are very large. For these reasons alone,
any statements decomposing the recent experi-
ence of forward rates into changes in expected
interest rates versus declining term premia are
subject to huge uncertainty.
To see this point, let’s try the simplest
approach to decomposing the yield curve. I run a
vector autoregression (VAR) of five forward rates
on their lags (I use the Fama-Bliss data available
from the Center for Research and Security Prices,
and I use a three-month moving average of for-
ward rates on the right-hand side, which Piazzesi
and I (2005) find improves forecasts by mitigating
measurement error):
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ft
￿n￿ = forward at time t for loans from
t + n – 1 to t + n
yt
￿1￿ = one-year rate at time t.
We can use this VAR to generate forecasts at each
date of future one-year rates, leaving (“estimating”)
the term premium as a residual,
You don’t have to estimate fancy term-structure
models to decompose the yield curve into
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Figure 2 presents the results, evaluated on
March 2006 (the last point in my data sample),
in the line labeled “VAR expected rate.” The line
captures a lot of common opinion: It says that
interest rates are expected to rise gently over the
next few years, leaving a negative term premium,
which is puzzling until you think through the
economics of long-term bond investing in a low-
inflation world. This kind of decomposition also
says that much of the recent decline in forward
rates comes from the term premium rather than
changes in expected long-term rates.
This all seems very sensible. However,
Figure 3 examines the same calculation over a
longer time interval. The lines represent, at each
date, expected one-year rates one, two, three,
etc., years in the future: that is, for Et￿y(1)
t+k￿ for
k = 1,2,3,... at each t. The graph dramatically
makes the point that long-horizon expected one-
year rates calculated by this method simply reflect
reversion to the mean. The 6.25 percent asymptote
in Figure 2 represented no specially sophisticated
regression forecast; it was simply the sample
interest rate.
There is nothing logically or econometrically
wrong with this conclusion, but do we really
believe it? For example, in 1980, this decomposi-
tion says that everyone knew interest rates would
decline from 16 percent back to an unconditional
mean of a bit over 6 percent, and rather rapidly,
so the then-flat yield curves represented very
large risk premia for holding long-term bonds.
But did people really believe inflation would be
tamed, or did perhaps the flat yield curves of the
time really represent a good chance that inflation
would re-emerge? Similarly, perhaps the sample
mean is now too high an estimate. Our data come
from inflation and its conquest. Perhaps it is
sensible now to think a “structural shift” has
happened, so the long-run mean should be a
good deal less than 6.25 percent.
As an alternative, let us try a forecast that
ignores this “level” information. On a statistical
basis, forward rates are clearly best modeled by a
single common trend that has a root that is near
if not equal to 1 and stationary spreads around
Cochrane
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March 2006 Forward Curve and Expected
One-Year Rates from a VAR in Levels and
from a Cointegrated VAR
NOTE: The one-standard-error bars are computed from a direct
regression forecast, Xt′cov(ʲ ˆ)Xt, using Hansen-Hodrick correc-
tion for serial correlation due to overlap.that trend. I estimate a VAR imposing that
restriction:
This is equivalent to simply running forecasting
regressions that set to zero a coefficient on the
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Intuitively, we still allow information such as
“the yield curve is upward sloping” to forecast
interest rate changes. We ignore information such
as “interest rates are low” to tell us interest rates
will rise.
Figure 4 presents expected one-year rates over
time by this method. You can see the huge differ-
ence. One-year rates are certainly not being fore-
cast to revert to a constant unconditional mean!
In particular, the flat yield curves of the 1980s are
not now interpreted to reveal huge risk premia
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Multiperiod One-Year-Rate Forecasts from a VAR in Levels
NOTE: Current one-year rate and expectations of one-year rates one, two, three, etc., years in the future, calculated by a simple VAR.not a pure random-walk model, and there is still
some forecastability left. For example, the steeply
upward-sloping yield curves of 2003-04 do fore-
cast substantial rises in short rates.
Figure 2 includes the March 2006 one-year
rate forecast from this method, in the line labeled
“∆ VAR Expected Rate.” This is also a sensible
forecast. Because we no longer use the informa-
tion that the current one-year rate is slightly below
its sample mean, we are left only with slope infor-
mation. The unusually flat slope of the forward
curve means, in this forecast, that interest rates
will decline somewhat, so that the term premium
is still somewhat positive. However, Figure 2
shows that long-term interest rate forecasts by
this method have been rising in recent years; so,
the decline in forward rates since 2004 is attrib-
uted even more to declining term premia by this
method than by the VAR in levels.
Can statistics help us? Alas, no. Testing for
unit roots, cointegration, etc., and imposing the
resulting structure on the analysis is not fruitful.
One naturally wants to think about “structural
shifts,” changing means, and so forth, and these
will be even more imprecisely estimated in now-
shorter samples. It is certainly true that the
dominant root of a persistent set of variables is
estimated with downward bias, so the actual
reversion to the mean is slower than the VAR in
levels indicates, but whether that mean makes
Cochrane
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Multiperiod One-Year-Rate Forecasts from a VAR in Levels
NOTE: Current one-year rate and expectations of one-year rates one, two, three, etc., years in the future, calculated by a VAR that
imposes a single common trend in forward rates.any sense in the first place is not something sta-
tistics can really help us with.
Can fancier models help us? In particular,
most of the term-structure literature does not look
at simple VAR forecasts. Instead, it estimates the
parameters of “affine models.” To think about
what these can do, it’s useful to have a specific
example in front of us, so here is the Ang and
Piazzesi (2003) model that we use in Cochrane
and Piazzesi (2005 and 2006). A vector of state
variables Xt follows an AR(1) process; the sto-
chastic discount factor is an exponential func-
tion of the state variables, with “market prices
of risk” (loadings of M on shocks to X) that also
depend on the state variables,
(1)
(2)
Assuming the shocks ʵ are i.i.d. normal with unit




and then yields and forward rates. Inverting (4),
we can reveal the “state variables” from bond
prices, yields, or forward rates. Thus, this model
becomes a structured factor model in which a
large collection of prices, yields, or forward rates
are described in terms of a few linear combinations
of those same prices, yields, or forward rates.
But, underlying the whole thing, we see a
VAR(1) in yields, prices, or forward rates—just
as we have been estimating all along! Thus the
only way the affine model can give us any different
answers from those of the ordinary least squares–
estimated VARs above is if the structure of market
prices of risk means that we use information in
the cross-section of bond prices to infer some-
thing about the dynamics. In general, this is not
the case. In Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) we show
how to construct market prices of risk, ʻ, from a
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given discrete-time VAR(1) to turn it into an affine
model. Thus, in general, the affine model lives
on top of a VAR estimate of long-term forward
rates and adds nothing to it. (There remains the
possibility that by restricting or modeling market
prices of risk, ʻ, in sensible ways, one obtains
information about the VAR (1), and this is the
point of our 2006 paper. But this is not [yet] a
common idea, and its success lies in the believ-
ability of a priori restrictions on ʻ.)
In addition, once we have settled on a speci-
fication, we have to wonder how much sampling
uncertainty in estimating the parameters translates
into uncertainty about the forecasts. To address
this question in a simple and transparent way, I
run direct forecasting regressions,
where the second equation defines notation. I find
the covariance matrix of ʲ ˆ
k, including a Hansen-
Hodrick correction for serial correlation due to
overlapping data, and then I calculate the error as
This is the error in the measurement of expected
interest rates due to sampling uncertainty in the
coefficients that comprise the regression forecast.
It is not the forecast error—that is, it is not a meas-
ure of how large ˃2(ʵt+k) is. The one-standard-error
bars in Figure 2 present this calculation. The term
premium is not statistically significant, and the
large difference between the two specifications is
barely two standard errors. The Hansen-Hodrick
correction for serial correlation is undoubtedly
optimistic—at the right-hand end of the graph
we’re forecasting interest rates 10 years ahead in
45 years of data—so the true sampling uncertainty
is undoubtedly a good deal larger.
Now, understanding that large roots and
common trends, which often must be specified a
priori, are crucial to long-term forecasts and that
long-run forecasts are subject to enormous sam-
pling uncertainty is not news. However, as I read
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long-term yield-curve decompositions. We are
usually treated only to one estimate based on
one a priori specification, usually in levels, and
usually with no measure of the huge sampling
uncertainty. Needless to say, the usual habit of
estimating 10-year interest rate forecasts by
extrapolating models fit to weekly or monthly
data is no help, and possibly a hindrance. The
520th power of a matrix is a difficult object to
estimate.
In sum, when a policymaker says something
that sounds definite, such as “long-run forward
rates have declined, while interest rate expecta-
tions have remained constant, so risk premia
have declined,” he is really guessing, and we
really have no idea whether this is a fact.
Measuring Risk Premia
We also know a good deal less about long-term
risk premia than we think we do. Quotes such as
those at the beginning of the paper suggest that
risk premia are well measured if perhaps poorly
understood. Nothing of the sort is true. We may
have a decent handle on one-year risk premia, as
surveyed in the paper and the subject of my next
set of comments, but the 10-year forward-rate
premium reflects not only this year’s expected
excess bond returns, but this year’s expectations
of next year’s expected returns, and so on and so
forth. If you like equations, an easy one in which
to see this point is
(5)




excess returns. The first term is the expectations
hypothesis. The second term is the risk premium,
and you see that the risk premium depends on
future expected excess returns, not just on current
expected excess returns.
Now, if expected excess returns lived off in
their own space, moving away in response to
shocks and then recovering without relation to
the rest of the yield curve, then, yes, there would
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be one “risk premium” that accounts for expected
excess returns, as well as long-horizon forward
and yield-curve risk premia. Alas, this is not the
case. Today’s level, slope, and curvature have
strong power to forecast next year’s expected
excess returns. (Characterizing these dynamics
is a major point of Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2006.)
We can easily be in a situation that this year’s
expected excess return, Etrxt+1, is large and posi-
tive, while future expected excess returns,
Et(rxt+k), are strongly negative, so the risk pre-
mium in the yield curve can be negative as well.
The one-year expected excess return can be posi-
tive while the 10-year forward rate is below its
corresponding expected one-year rate. It is pre-
cisely by such differences in expected future risk
premia that the two decompositions shown in
Figure 2 can produce forward rate premia of dif-
ferent signs, despite the same initial return risk
premium.
In sum, there is no single “risk premium.”
There is a full-term structure of return risk pre-
mia, which moves over time in interesting and
still poorly measured ways. Sure statements that
risk premia have moved down over time do not
reflect any solid and independent measurement.
FORECASTING, TERM PREMIA,
AND MACROECONOMICS
One of the major contributions of the
Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson paper is the
empirical work linking bond risk premia and
macroeconomics. By restating the points in my
own way and slightly disagreeing with some
conclusions, I think I can usefully highlight this
important part of the paper.
Naturally, I like the Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005) measurement of the risk premium, so I’ll
focus my comments on that paper. Briefly, we
noticed that regressions of excess returns on ex
ante forward rates follow a nearly exact one-factor
structure: That is, that regressions
almost exactly follow
rx y f f t
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“return-forecasting factor,” ʳ ′ft, describes expected
excess returns of all maturities. Longer-maturity
bonds’ expected excess returns move more, and
shorter-maturity bonds’ expected excess returns
move less, but they all move in lockstep. Thus,
we estimate the common “return-forecasting fac-
tor” by running a single regression of average
(across maturity) returns on all forward rates:
where the first equality defines notation. Sensi-
tive to “levels” issues, we obtain nearly identical
results by ruling out a level effect:
The coefficients ʳ have a pretty tent shape. This
measure of bond risk premia values curvature in
the forward curve, not slope in the forward curve.
Figure 5 shows how this works and the con-
nection between macroeconomics and bond risk
premia: In January 2002 (shown by the first ver-
tical lines in panels A, B, and D), the recession
and interest rates have just finished their stage of
steep decline, as seen also in the unemployment
rate (panel D). The forward curve is upward slop-
ing, but it is also very curved (panel C). The curved
forward rate, interacting with the tent-shaped ʳ,
is the sign of risk premia. This means (statistically)
that the upward slope will not be soon matched
by rises in interest rates, so the greater yields on
long-term bonds are (risky) profit for investors.
The risk premium (panel B) is very high. In fact,
this prediction is borne out: Interest rates do not
rise for several years, so investors who bought
long-term bonds in January 2002 profited hand-
somely for a few years.
By contrast, consider January 2004. Now, the
forward curve still slopes up substantially (panel
rx b y f f t
n
































































C), but it is no longer particularly curved, so the
tent-shaped ʳ coefficients no longer predict much
of a risk premium (panel B). Now, the upward-
sloping yield curve does signal rises in interest
rates; the expectations hypothesis is working;
returns on long-term bonds will be no higher
(on average) than those on short-term bonds.
Again, this prediction is borne out. This time,
interest rates do rise. This is a repeated statistical
pattern, working the same way in many previous
recessions.
Having digested what term-premium forecasts
are and how they work, we see that the graphs
show several patterns seen in more-formal regres-
sions. First, the term premium ( ʳ ′f here, as well
as other measures in the paper) drives out slope
variables for forecasting bond excess returns.
Previously, Fama and Bliss (1987), Campbell and
Shiller (1991), and others found that measures of
the term-structure slope forecast excess returns.
Yes, we see the slope is high in 2002, when long-
term bond holders turn out to make money. But
it is also high in 2004 when they don’t. When you
put the slope and the curvature of the forward rate
together in a multiple regression, the curvature
measured by ʳ wins out. The slope seemed to fore-
cast bond returns because it was correlated with
the curve measure. (See, for example, Table A3
of the appendix to Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005.)
Second, the term premium is high in the
depths of a recession. In Figure 5, this is measured
by the association of the term premium (panel B)
with unemployment (panel D). The association
is even stronger in previous recessions. In macro-
economic terms (that’s why we’re here), this is
natural. The risk premium is high at the early
stage of a recession, a time in which investors
don’t want to hold risk of any kind. Stock prices
are low, predicting higher-than-average stock
returns; interest rates are low relative to foreign
interest rates, predicting high returns for holding
exchange-rate risk. By January 2004, however,
the recession is over, the period of growth and
rising interest rates has set in, and everybody
knows it. It’s not a surprise that the premium for
holding risk during recessions has vanished.
Cochrane
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 2007 279Third, and the major point of the authors’
paper (as I see it), the slope of the yield curve
drives out the risk premium for forecasting 1-year
gross domestic product (GDP) growth. We see this
in panel B of Figure 5: The risk premium is high
in 2002, when GDP is not about to grow. The risk
premium is low in 2004, when GDP is about to
grow. The slope is high in both times. Thus, the
slope carries GDP forecast power, and the slope,
purged of its correlation with the risk premium,
forecasts GDP even better.
This point is made in their paper in the
regression of Table 2, last column, which I take
to be the central result:
where y = GDP; exsp is the expectations-
hypothesis component of the 10-year rate; tp is
the term premium component of the 10-year rate,
as in (5); t-statistics are in parentheses; and the
sample is from 1962 to 2005.
y y exsp exsp tt t t +− −= + − 44 03 842 2 09 656 2 . .. . ( )( ) ( ) )
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Macroeconomics and the Yield Curve
NOTE: Vertical lines mark interesting dates. Panel A: federal funds rate and 1- to 15-year forward rates through the previous recession.
Panel B: Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) measures of the bond risk premium. Panel C: forward curves on the two indicated dates.
Panel D: unemployment rate.
SOURCE: Data for yields and forward rates past a five-year maturity are from Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006).The authors (p. 261) say of this regression,
“The coefficient on the risk-neutral expectations
component of the yield curve slope [0.96] is now
larger and more statistically significant than in
any of the earlier specifications,” which is the
same interpretation I gave in discussing the figure.
The authors also say (p. 261), “More impor-
tantly for this paper, we find that the estimated
coefficient on the term premium is now negative
and (marginally) statistically significant. Accord-
ing to these results, a decline in the term premium
tends to be followed by faster GDP growth—the
opposite sign of the relationship uncovered by
previous empirical studies.” I read the evidence
differently: Rather than accept a marginally sig-
nificant coefficient with the wrong sign, it seems
to me the right lesson is that the second coefficient
is zero. The slope of the yield curve forecasts GDP
growth, but not risk premia. The curvature of the
forward curve measures risk premia, but not GDP
growth. Risk premia are high precisely when we
are not sure whether the recession is over.
Table 8 of Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006) runs
the same sort of regression. At a four-quarter
horizon, they find
where EH = expectations hypothesis; RP = risk
premium in the 20-quarter term spread (i.e., the
terms in (5), estimated from a macro-affine model);
and t-statistics are in parentheses. In this slightly
different specification, they confirm the huge
significance of the expectations-hypothesis term,
but find an insignificant contribution due to the
risk-premium term.
This view dovetails with the other side of risk
premia that Monika Piazzesi and I (2006) have
recently started investigating. From the basic
asset-pricing relation, 1 = Et(Mt+1Rt+1), and (2),
we can write
(6)
Note the absence of an n index on ʻ. The point
of this equation is that expected excess returns
on each bond must be earned in compensation
for, and in proportion to, the covariance of that
bond’s return with macroeconomic shocks, ʵ. So
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far, we have been talking about the left-hand side:
What models or state variables drive variation
over time in expected excess returns? Now, it’s
time to start working on the right-hand side: What
are the shocks? Piazzesi and I find that the term
premium is almost exactly earned entirely in
compensation for shocks to the level of the term
structure. The prices of risk, ʻ, corresponding to
other term-structure shocks are essentially zero.
In particular, expected returns seem not to be
earned in compensation for “slope” shocks. This
finding lets us start to think about macroeco-
nomics. Whatever the macroeconomic determi-
nants of bond risk premia, they must be variables
with “level” effects on the term structure. This
observation quickly rules out monetary policy,
whose shocks typically raise short rates while
lowering or leaving unchanged long rates—
a “slope” shock.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
In sum, I think we are headed to a view that
slope movements in the yield curve, which are
related to monetary policy, are also related to
expected GDP growth, as seen in the usual
impulse-response functions. But slope move-
ments do not signal risk premia (left-hand side
of (6)), nor does covariance with monetary policy
shocks generate real risk premia (right-hand side
of (6)). Term premia are large in the early phases
of recessions, when it’s not clear how long the
recession will last; they are revealed by the cur-
vature of the forward rate, and they are earned in
compensation for macroeconomic risks that cor-
respond to shocks in the level of the yield curve.
Of course, we have no economic models of
any of these fascinating statistical regularities.
This point is made clear in the brilliant survey
of total failures that occupies a large part of the
paper. First, what are the macroeconomic state
variables that drive variation in expected returns?
What exactly are the times and states of nature
in which expected returns are high? Second,
expected returns are generated by the covariance
of returns with macroeconomic shocks. What are
these macroeconomic shocks? These questions
are, as ever, the Holy Grail of macro-finance.
Cochrane
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